### Models and techniques for quantifying macroeconomic risk

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### Introduction

- During times of financial crises, losses tend to spread across financial institutions, threatening the system as a whole;
- The spread of distress gives rise to systemic risk the risk that the intermediation capacity of the entire financial system is impaired, with potential negative externalities to the real economy;
- A systemic risk measure should reflect the size, leverage, liquidity, interconnections, complexity and substitutability of a financial institution;

### Motivation

- The recent financial crisis gave birth to extensive research in the fields of systemic risk (definition, measurement, regulation);
- Of particular interest is the identification of *SIFIs* (Systemically Important Financial Institutions) that contribute the most to the overall risk of the financial system;
- The measures used in this paper capture periods of financial disturbance;
- Related research is underlying new regulations which will be emphasized, the reorganization of financial systems, new perspectives upon financial fragility and its systemic characteristics

### Main literature

- 1. Adrian, T. and M. K. Brunnermeier (2011) CoVaR. Working Paper, Princeton University and Federal Reserve Bank of New York;
- 2. Benoit, S., G. Colletaz, C. Hurlin, and C. Perignon (2013) A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk Measures. Working Paper;
- 3. Bisias, D., M. D. Flood, A. W. Lo, and S. Valavanis (2012) A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics. Working Paper, MIT;
- 4. Brownlees, T.C., and R.F. Engle, (2012) Volatility, Correlation and Tails for Systemic Risk Measurement. Working Paper, NYU;
- 5. Koenker, R. and G. Jr. Basset (1978) Regression Quantiles. Econometrica 46 (1), 33-50;

# Methodology (1)

- $\triangle CoVaR DCC$ :
- Consider a bivariate GARCH process for the price returns:

$$r_t = H_t^{1/2} v_t$$

where  $r'_t = (r_{mt} r_{it})$  represents the vector of market and bank *i* returns,  $v'_t = (\varepsilon_{mt} \xi_{it})$  denotes the *i.i.d.* random vector;

$$H_t = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_{mt}^2 & \rho_{it}\sigma_{mt}\sigma_{it} \\ \rho_{it}\sigma_{mt}\sigma_{it} & \sigma_{it}^2 \end{pmatrix},$$

is the variance-covariance matrix, estimated with a *DCC GARCH* process

# Methodology (2)

• Considering a Cholesky decomposition of the variancecovariance matrix  $H_t$ :

$$H_t^{1/2} = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_{mt} & \sigma_{it}\rho_{it} \\ 0 & \sigma_{it}\sqrt{1-\rho_{it}^2} \end{pmatrix}$$

• The system's (market) returns can be written as:

$$r_{mt} = \frac{\sigma_{mt}}{\sigma_{it}\rho_{it}}r_{it} - \frac{\sigma_{mt}\sqrt{1-\rho_{it}^2}}{\rho_{it}}\xi_{it}$$

### Methodology (3)

• *CoVaR* is defined as follows:

$$\mathbb{P}(r_{mt} \le CoVaR_{q,t}^{i} | r_{it} = VaR_{q,t}^{i}) = q\%$$

• The system return conditional distribution is:

$$r_{mt} \mid r_{it} \sim N\left(\frac{r_{it}\sigma_{mt}\rho_{it}}{\sigma_{it}}, (1-\rho_{it}^2)\sigma_{mt}^2\right)$$

• It follows that:

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\left(\frac{r_{mt} - r_{it}\rho_{it}\sigma_{mt}/\sigma_{it}}{\sigma_{mt}\sqrt{1 - \rho_{it}^2}}\right|r_{it} = VaR_{q,t}^i\right) \le \frac{CoVaR_{q,t}^i - r_{it}\rho_{it}\sigma_{mt}/\sigma_{it}}{\sigma_{mt}\sqrt{1 - \rho_{it}^2}}\right) = q\%$$

## Methodology (4)

• Combining the formulas and holding on the Gaussian distribution assumption:

$$CoVaR_{q,t}^{i} = -\phi^{-1}(q\%)\sigma_{mt}\sqrt{1-\rho_{it}^{2}} + \phi^{-1}(q\%)\frac{\rho_{it}\sigma_{mt}}{\sigma_{it}}$$

$$CoVaR_{50\%,t}^{i} = -\phi^{-1}(q\%)\sigma_{mt}\sqrt{1-\rho_{it}^{2}+\phi^{-1}(50\%)\frac{\rho_{it}\sigma_{mt}}{\sigma_{it}}}$$

Δ*CoVaR* captures the increase in *CoVaR* when institution *i* moves from the median state to its *VaR* state;

# Methodology (5)

• Δ*CoVaR* becomes:

$$\Delta CoVaR_{q,t}^{i} = CoVaR_{t}^{m|r_{it}=VaR_{q,t}^{i}} - CoVaR_{t}^{m|r_{it}=VaR_{50\%,t}^{i}}$$

$$=\frac{\rho_{it}\sigma_{mt}}{\sigma_{it}}(VaR_{q,t}^{i}-VaR_{50\%,t}^{i})$$

where  $\sigma_{it}$  and  $\sigma_{mt}$  are bank *i*'s and system's volatilities at time *t* and  $\rho_{it}$  is the conditional correlation;

• The above variables are estimated by the *DCC GARCH* process using standard QML techniques;

# Methodology (6)

- ΔCoVaR Quant:
- Another way to estimate  $\Delta CoVaR$  is through quantile regressions;

$$CoVaR_q^{m|r_i=VaR_q^i} = VaR_q^m|VaR_q^i = \hat{\alpha}_q^i + \hat{\beta}_q^i VaR_q^i$$

• Then,  $\triangle CoVaR$  is given by:

$$\Delta CoVaR_{q,t}^{i} = CoVaR_{q,t}^{i} - CoVaR_{50\%,t}^{i}$$
$$= \hat{\beta} \left( \widehat{VaR}_{q,t}^{i} - \widehat{VaR}_{50\%,t}^{i} \right)$$

where  $\hat{\beta}$  is the coefficient estimated by the quantile regression;

# Methodology (7)

- *MES*:
- *MES* is the marginal contribution of an institution *i* to systemic risk, as measured by the Expected Shortfall (*ES*) of the system;

$$ES_{mt}(C) = \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(r_{mt}|r_{mt} < C) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} w_{it} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(r_{it}|r_{mt} < C)$$

• *MES* corresponds to the partial derivative of the system *ES* with respect to the weight of bank *i* in the economy:

$$MES_{it}(C) = \frac{\partial ES_{mt}(C)}{\partial w_{it}} = \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(r_{it} | r_{mt} < C)$$

# Methodology (8)

• Choosing the transposed matrix from the Cholesky factorization of the variance-covariance matrix, the following equations are obtained:

$$r_{mt} = \sigma_{mt} \varepsilon_{mt}$$
$$r_{it} = \sigma_{it} \rho_{it} \varepsilon_{mt} + \sigma_{it} \sqrt{1 - \rho_{it}^2} \xi_{it}$$

• Considering a systemic event *C*, *MES* is defined as:

$$MES_{it}(C) = \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(r_{it}|r_{mt} < C)$$

$$MES_{it}(C) = \sigma_{it}\rho_{it}\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\left(\varepsilon_{mt}|\varepsilon_{mt} < \frac{C}{\sigma_{mt}}\right) + \sigma_{it}\sqrt{1-\rho_{it}^2}\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\left(\xi_{it}|\varepsilon_{mt} < \frac{C}{\sigma_{mt}}\right)$$

# Methodology (9)

- SRISK:
- The *SRISK* measure extends the *MES* in order to take into account both the liabilities and the size of the financial institution;
- The *SRISK* corresponds to the expected capital shortfall of a given financial institution, conditional on a crisis affecting the whole financial system:

 $SRISK_{it} = max \left[ 0; \frac{Required Capital}{k (D_{it} + (1 - LRMES_{it})W_{it})} - \frac{Available Capital}{(1 - LRMES_{it})W_{it}} \right]$ 

• The banks with the largest capital shortfall are considered systemically risky

# Methodology (10)

• SRISK can be rewritten as:

 $SRISK_{it} = max[0; [k L_{it} - 1 + (1 - k) LRMES_{it}]W_{it}]$ 

where k is the prudential capital ratio (8%),  $D_{it}$  is the book value of total liabilities and  $W_{it}$  is the market valued equity;

• The *SRISK* also considers the interconnection of a bank with the rest of the system through the long-run marginal expected shortfall (*LRMES*):

$$LRMES_{it} \cong 1 - \exp(18 \times MES_{it})$$

• This approximation represents the bank expected loss over a sixmonth horizon, obtained conditionally on the market falling by more than 40% within the next six months;

### Data

- The data used in the empirical analysis are from 40 publicly traded commercial banks, components of STOXX Europe 600 Banks as a proxy for the European financial system. The main datasets are time series of stock price with daily frequency, total debt and number of shares outstanding, extracted from quarterly balance sheets;
- The system's serie (daily returns) is calculated by summing the market value equity weighted stock return of each bank as:

$$r_{mt} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{MV_{t-1}^{i} \times r_{it}}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} MV_{t-1}^{j}}$$

- Period analysed: 25.apr.2005 30.sep.2014;
- Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon Datastream

# Results (1)

• An important remark is that different systemic risk measures return different rankings:

#### Table 5.1: Systemic risk rankings (30.09.2014)

Ranks	ΔCoVaR DCC	MES	SRISK
1	HSBC	BCA dei Paschi	Deutschebank
2	RBS	BCA Popolare	BNP
3	Lloyds	UBI BCA	Credit Agricole
4	Deutschebank	BCA Milano	Societe Generale
5	Mediobanca	RBS	ING

# Results (2)

- *MES* and equity *Beta* rankings are similar because of the existance of a strong correlation;
- If  $\xi_{it}$  and  $\varepsilon_{mt}$  are independent, then:

$$MES_{it}(C) = \sigma_{it}\rho_{it}\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\left(\varepsilon_{mt}|\varepsilon_{mt} < \frac{C}{\sigma_{mt}}\right)$$
$$MES_{it}(C) = \sigma_{it}\rho_{it}\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(\varepsilon_{mt}|r_{mt} < C)$$

$$\beta_{it} = cov(r_{it}, r_{mt})/var(r_{mt}) = \rho_{it}\sigma_{it}/\sigma_{mt}$$

• Rewriting:

$$MES_{it}(C) = \beta_{it}\sigma_{mt}\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(\varepsilon_{mt}|r_{mt} < C)$$
$$= \beta_{it}\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(r_{mt}|r_{mt} < C)$$

# Results (3)

• *MES* of financial institution *i* is proportional with its systematic risk measured by time-varying *Beta*. The proportionality coefficient is the *ES* of the system:

$$MES_{it}(q) = \beta_{it}ES_{mt}(q)$$

• *MES* and *Beta* return similar rankings, even on the relaxed hypothesis of the correlated system and institution innovations:

### Table 5.2: Top 5 financial institutions identified by MES (siystemics)and Beta (systematics) (30.09.2014)

Ranks	Bank (MES)	MES(%)	Bank (Beta)	Beta
1	BCA dei Paschi	2,94%	BCA dei Paschi	1,72
2	BCA Popolare	2,78%	BCA Popolare	1,65
3	UBI BCA	2,38%	RBS	1,48
4	BCA Milano	1,99%	UBI BCA	1,42
5	RBS	1,93%	Mediobanca	1,37

Results (4)

### Table 5.3: Top 5 systemic financial institutions identified by SRISK(30.09.2014)

Ranks	Bank	SRISK (EUR)	SRISK (%)
1	Deutschebank	105.457.228	17.54%
2	BNP	101.177.567	16,82%
3	Credit Agricole	95.533.245	15,89%
4	Societe Generale	72.603.694	12,07%
5	ING	42.186.837	7,02%

• SRISK (%) can be interpreted as a contribution of the considered bank to systemic risk through its share of total decapitalisation of the market at day t, calculated as:

$$SRISK_t^i(\%) = \frac{SRISK_t^i}{\sum_j^N SRISK_t^j}$$

### Results (5)



## Results (6)

• Table 5.4 shows the top 5 systemic financial institutions estimated both with *DCC* and *quantile regressions* with respect to their contributions, calculated as an average on the analysed period:

Fable 5.4: Top 5 systemic banks identified by $\Delta  extsf{CoVaR}$ DCC an	d
<b>∆CoVaR Quant</b>	

Ranks	Bank	Average ΔCoVaR DCC	Bank	Average ΔCoVaR Quant(%)
1	HSBC	3,50%	HSBC	3,66%
2	RBS	3,25%	UBI BCA	2,97%
3	Lloyds	3,07%	RBS	2,58%
4	Deutschebank	2,47%	Unicredit	2,45%
5	Unicredit	2,19%	Emilia Romagna	2,37%

### Results (7)

• For the sake of comparison, I will only focus on the  $\triangle CoVaR DCC$  estimates, with respect to the common framework of dynamic conditional correlation. In Table 5.5 we can see the identified *SIFIs* rankings on the last day of the analysed period, 30.09.2014:

Table 5.5: Top 5 systemic financial institutions identified by  $\Delta CoVaR$ DCC (30.09.2014)

Ranks	Bank	$\Delta CoVaR DCC(\%)$
1	HSBC	1,39%
2	RBS	1,26%
3	Lloyds	1,24%
4	Deutschebank	1,18%
5	Mediobanca	0,84%

### Results (8)





### Results (9)

• Evolution of  $I \triangle CoVaR DCC$ :

#### Delta CoVaR DCC



### Results (10)

• Evolution of *I* SRISK:



# Concluding remarks (1)

- The rankings based on different systemic risk measures are not identical;
- The reason for the different rankings is basically the difference in the estimation methodology;
- The empirical application returned a single financial institution identified as *SIFI* by both Δ*CoVaR* and *SRISK* in the last day of the time horizon, namely *Deutschebank*. *SRISK* ranks it the first with a contribution of 17,54% (approximately 105 mil. EUR), while Δ*CoVaR* ranks it the fourth with a contribution to the system's loss of 1,18%;
- The *MES* model is not a very reliable tool for systemic risk rankings because of the existance of strong correlation with the systematic risk (*Beta*), returning similar rankings;

# Concluding remarks (2)

- The estimated systemic risk measures capture the comovement of tail distributions and are increasing in crisis periods;
- However, these estimates are not sufficient for the regulators to take a decision on imposing capital requirements or liquidity buffers;
- It is necessary to model some other aspects, like interbank linkages which can transform into transmission channels for the shocks, for them to have a rich picture of financial fragility;
- Based on the constructed indicators and on the new progressively implementing regulations of Basel III, there is no strong evidence that indicates market pressure or the trigger of a new systemic crisis.

### Thank You!